

















Intervention Preparedness in Germany  







Robert Koch Institute 
Dr. Markus Kirchner 
Department for Infectious Disease Epidemiology 
KirchnerM@rki.de 
Dr. Christian Herzog 
Dr. Iris Hunger 










This consensus document was produced in cooperation with the high and highest state health 
authorities, the Committee for Biological Agents (ABAS), the German Society for Infectious Diseases 
(DGI), the German Society for Tropical Medicine (DTG), the Germany Society for Hygiene and 
Microbiology, the Society for Virology (GfV), the German Association for the Control of Virus 
Diseases (DVV), the Paul Ehrlich Institute (PEI), the German Institute for Drugs and Medical 
Devices (BfArM), the Permanent Working Group of Medical Competence and Treatment Centers for 
highly contagious, life-threatening diseases (STAKOB), the National Reference Center for Tropical 
Infections at the Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine, Hamburg (BINTM), and the 


































































The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa is the largest recognized outbreak 
of this disease to date. It is also the first such outbreak including cases infected outside of Africa. 
The risk of an introduction of EVD to Germany (defined as an infected person entering Germany and 
passing the infection to others) is very low. But it cannot be totally excluded that in isolated 
instances infected persons could enter unrecognizably during the incubation period, potentially 
leading to a limited number of secondary infections in Germany.  
Germany is well prepared for having cases of EVD. Treatment capacities for patients with highly 
contagious and life-threatening diseases are higher than in any other industrialized nation. Medical 
care can be provided to the highest standard. The German Public Health Service (ÖGD) works 
efficiently. In a crisis situation, national, state and local level authorities collaborate effectively, as has 
lately been thoroughly practiced in a large multi-state exercise (LÜKEX 2013). Levels of government 
regularly exchange information, and infection control recommendations are harmonized.   
This framework sums up available information, recommendations and regulations regarding 
infection control and clinical management of EVD cases in Germany within the context of the current 
outbreak in West Africa. Biological safety rules and regulations regarding technical, logistical and 
personal protective measures have been taken into account. It is a work in progress, intended to 
further evolve over time.  
Of note: The existing small risk the outbreak poses for the German population can only be 
minimized substantially and sustainably by combating the epidemic in West Africa urgently and 
effectively.  
 






This framework is intended to guide recognition, assessment and management of cases of EVD in 
Germany. The earlier and better suspected cases can be assessed and infection control measure 
applied, the greater the chance to completely avoid secondary infections or at least limit their 
numbers.  
This framework combines existing information, scientific recommendations, regulations and other 
publicly available documents regarding the management of EVD in Germany, put into perspective of 
the current outbreak in West Africa.  
The framework describes standard operating procedures, tasks and responsibilities in any case of a 
patient with EVD being diagnosed in Germany, but especially within the context of the current 
outbreak in West Africa.  
2.	 Intended	Audience	
This framework is written for members of the Public Health Service in Germany (local health 
authorities, high and highest state health authorities, high and highest national level authorities) as 
well as medical staff in hospitals, private practices and emergency medical services in Germany. 
Moreover, it covers the interface of the Public Health Service with other institutions (e.g. the fire 
service, police, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief and aid organizations).  
3.	 Risk	Assessment	(As	of	December	2014)	
 
The risk of an introduction of EVD to Germany (defined as an infected person entering Germany and 
passing the infection to others) is very low:  
Among 100 air travelers from West Africa only about one person is headed for Germany. In the past 
months only very few infected persons have left the affected countries by regular air transport. 
The affected countries conduct exit screening. However, it cannot be excluded that in isolated 
instances a person travels while incubating the infection (time between infection and symptom 
onset) and while exit screening is ineffective in recognizing infection. Such a case leading to a limited 
number of secondary infections would be possible in Germany.  
However, further transmission of the Ebola virus within the German population appears even in light 
of a few imported infections practically impossible, since Germany fulfills all prerequisites to 




Ebolavirus is a genus within the filovirus family. Three of the recognized Ebola virus species have 
caused large-scale outbreaks of human disease (Zaire, Sudan, Bundibugyo). Ebola virus infection 




EVD is a relatively rare disease. Large outbreaks of EVD have been recognized since 1976 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), the current South Sudan, the Republic of Congo, 
Uganda and Gabon. In March 2014 the West African country Guinea confirmed an outbreak caused 
by the Zaire species of Ebola virus. From there the epidemic spread to neighboring countries and 
now represents the largest known outbreak of EVD. By now (November 2014), exported cases of 
EVD have also been reported outside of Africa, namely in the USA, and secondary infections 
associated with the care for patients infected in Africa occurred in Spain and the USA.  
An independent outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo was discovered in August 2014 and 
declared over November 21st 2014 by the WHO.  
Further information about the current outbreak in West African can be found in appendix A and 
 http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/ebola_marburg_fevers/pages/index.aspx  
 http://who.int/csr/en/  
4.3	 Routes	of	Infection	
There are still doubts about the animal reservoir of Ebola virus. Zoonotic sources of infection are 
apparently great apes and fruit bats. Humans can become infected by contact with infected animals 
(e.g. during hunting of so called “bush meat”, preparation and eating of wild animal products. 
Transmission from human-to-human is possible through direct contact with EVD patients or the 
corpses of those who have died of EVD, or by contact with their blood and other body fluids/excreta. 
Patient infectiousness increases along with viremia throughout the course of disease. A study on 
EVD patients in Liberia (see Reference 7) did not observe any transmission from patients within the 
early febrile phase (prior to onset of gastrointestinal symptoms). There is no indication that filo 
viruses can be transmitted airborne human-to-human via aerosols. 
However, patients vomiting heavily or suffering from severe (explosive) diarrhea can generate 
infectious droplets. Thus, from a preventive point of view wearing of respiratory masks is required in 
close contact situations with these patients (see chapter 7.2.3.2).  
Ebola virus can stay infectious outside of the body for a few days. Infection via fomites contaminated 
with body fluids, such as syringes, mattresses etc., is possible. On surfaces exposed to sunlight or 
under dry conditions the virus is being inactivated more quickly. 
4.4	 Clinical	Picture	
After an incubation periods of between 2 and 21 days (median 8-9 days) EVD begins with non-
specific symptoms such as fever, headaches, muscle aches, fatigue (early, febrile phase).  
After a few days, nausea, vomiting, gastroenteritis and epigastric pain typically appear 
(gastrointestinal phase). Some patients also suffer from conjunctivitis, pharyngitis, hiccups, delirium 
and a maculo-papular exanthema.  
In later stages of disease, hemorrhagic manifestations including multiple bleeding sites are typical 
for EVD. Mainly the gastrointestinal tract, lungs and gums are affected. However, in the current 
outbreak hemorrhagic signs are seen only in a minority of patients. 
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From towards the end of the gastrointestinal phase patients either slowly recover or deteriorate 
towards metabolic acidosis due to severe hypovolemic shock.  
Figure 1: NEJM, Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa - Clinical Manifestations and Management, November 5th, 
2014) 
EVD lethality ranges between 30 and 90%, depending on virus species. In the past, in outbreaks of 
Ebola Zaire 70-90% of the patients died with the clinical picture of multi-organ failure. In the current 
outbreak in West Africa lethality is generally around 70%, however under optimal intensive care 
lethality appears to be clearly lower. 
For information on therapy see chapter 7.2.7. 
4.5	 Period	of	Transmissibility	
Disease transmission within the incubation period has never been described.  
EVD patients are contagious at least while they have symptoms and viremea. Infectiousness 
correlates with disease severity and is highest late in the disease, when viral load is peaking. It is 
unclear whether post-recovery protracted viral excretion (e.g. in urine) is relevant. In the main 
outbreak area, many infections apparently are due to contact with the bodies of deceased EVD 
patients (e.g. during funeral practices). 
In some male patients, Ebola virus was isolated from semen up to 3 months post symptom onset.   
5.	  Recognition	
5.1	 Clinical	Procedure	upon	Suspicion	of	EVD	and	Early	Measures	
Any suspicion of EVD has to be thoroughly assessed. Ruling out differential diagnoses of other 
tropical diseases, especially malaria, is complicated by the non-specificity of early EVD symptoms 
(see chapter 5.2). Taking a comprehensive travel and exposure history thus is critical.  
Procedure	
Assessment of suspected cases of EVD is conducted based on the clinical picture as well as travel 
and contact history. In most cases, an anamnestic interview conducted from at least one meter 
distance from the patient should suffice to rule out whether the patient is a “well-founded suspect 
case“ (the German term is comparable to the EU “probable case” definition; therefore in the 
following document it is referred to as “probable case”) (see appendix B).  
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The patient needs to be made aware, that the information provided in the assessment of the EVD 
risk is of vital interest for him/her as well as any contacts including family and friends: The earlier 
appropriate medical care can commence, the more likely life threatening complication can be 
avoided.  
Upon receipt of anamnestic information supportive of probable case status, the local health 
authority is to be called in (see chapter 7.1). The final decision, whether a patient represents a 
probable case of EVD is to be taken between the physician and the local health authority, under 
advise from an appropriate Medical Competence and Treatment Center (see appendix C) and the 
State health authority. Until the decision is taken whether the patient represents a probable case, any 
stable patient is to remain in his/her current environment (at home, in private practice, hospital 
emergency room).  
Protective	measures	to	be	taken	during	assessment	of	suspected	cases	
The following protective measures apply when taking anamnestic history of a patient suspected of 
having EVD: 
 Distance of >1m from the patient; 
 Minimizing contact; 
 Routine hygiene measures. 
In case the patient’s health status warrants physical examination, or if contact to body fluids seems 
likely (e.g. when the patient is vomiting), the following protective measures (PPE) are recommended: 
 disposable suits Category III, preferably Type 3B or Type 4B, or as an alternative floor-
length and long-sleeved gowns with back lock (liquid-tight material ; 
 Two pairs of gloves  
 Protective goggles  or face protective shield; 
 FFP3 half-mask; 
 Disposable over boots or rubber boots. 
Additional advice on PPE (see chapter 7.2.3.2 and appendix D). 
Advice regarding therapy (see chapter 7.2.6). 





A patient with fever (>38.5°C), or elevated temperature combined with other symptoms (e.g. 
diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, bleeding), 
 who in the 21 days pre symptom onset had contact* with an EVD patient, a patient 
suspected of having EVD or a person who died of EVD, 
or 
 who in the 21 days pre symptom onset worked with Ebola virus, Ebola virus containing 
materials, or Ebola virus infected animals in a laboratory or any other institution. in 
Germany or elsewhere, 
or 
 who in the 21 days pre symptom onset spent time in a known Ebola virus endemic area 
(country reporting repeated cases in the past) or in an area which recently reported EVD 
cases for the first time, 
 and 
 who there had contact to fruit bats, other bats, or non-human primates (e.g. as bush meat, 
direct contact to live animals or their feces). 
*Contact:  
 direct contact with blood or other body fluids, or infectious tissue of a probable or confirmed case of EVD, or a 
person having died of EVD, or potential contact with Ebola virus contaminated clothing/objects; 
 unprotected contact (<1m) with a probable or confirmed case of EVD, or a person having died of EVD 
(including household contacts, flight passengers having sat 1 seat in any direction from a case, including across 
the aisle and crew members tending to the case); 
 presence in an African hospital, potentially treating cases of EVD. 
 
Not classified as contact: Having been in the same room/transport vehicle, >1m away. 
A flowchart aiding in the assessment of these criteria can be found in appendix B. 
Initial	measures	to	be	taken	in	context	of	a	probable	case	of	EVD	
For any patient assessed by the local health authority to meet the case definition of a probable case 
of EVD, said local health authority, involved physicians and potentially the Medical Competence and 
Treatment Centers (see appendix C) and the responsible state health authority should seek 
immediate transfer of the patient to a special isolation unit within one of the Medical Competence 
and Treatment Centers. This is especially urgent for more symptomatic patients (e.g. those vomiting 
and with diarrhea) and those in immediate need of advanced clinical care and laboratory diagnostics. 
In the special isolation unit, routine laboratory diagnostics can be conducted according to point-of-
care procedures, as well as diagnostics for Ebola virus infection and differential diagnoses including 
malaria (see chapter 5.3). 
Especially for probable cases of EVD who are not yet very ill (early febrile phase), and without urgent 
requirement of any procedure or emergency laboratory tests, the local health authority can assess 
whether the probable case of EVD can remain in his/her current environment. This would be 
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possible, if the locale (e.g. private residence, physician’s office, hospital emergency room) is 
considered an”appropriate environment“ according to § 30 IfSG.  
Under these circumstances it can be considered jointly between the local health authority and the 
Medical Competence and Treatment Center to take a blood sample on location and to then initiate 
Ebola virus diagnostics. 
Additional advice on sample taking, transport and diagnostics see chapter 5.3. 
For any patient in preliminary isolation in their current environment (e.g. in a private room) barrier 
nursing procedures need to be followed (see chapter 7.2.2). The measure has to be upheld until the 
patient has been determined to be Ebola virus negative, or until the patient is laboratory confirmed 
and moved to a special isolation unit. 
For any patient care, appropriate personal protective equipment according to chapter 7.2.3.2 is to be 
worn.  
For further information see appendix E. 
Notification	and	transmission	procedures	regarding	a	probable	case	of	EVD	
Any probable case of EVD is notifiable as a suspected case of a viral hemorrhagic fever by the 
treating physician to the local health authority according to § 6 of the IfSG. For this purpose, the 
physician is permitted to breach of patient confidentiality. 
These notifications need to reach the local health authority within 24 hours after the physician comes 
to raise the suspicion of EVD. From there they are further transmitted according to §§ 11,12 IfSG in 
electronic format to the appropriate state health authority and the RKI. 
For further advice see chapter 7.1.1. 
5.2	 Differential	Diagnoses	
Assessment of differential diagnoses is essential to avoid therapy delays for other potentially life-
threatening diseases (e.g. malaria) and to prevent false alarms with far reaching consequences.  
Procedure	
Clinical differential diagnosis is the consideration of other diseases presenting with similar clinical 
pictures. Regarding tropical infections, for any patient with unexplained fever malaria has to be 
strongly considered. Due to the high lethality of untreated malaria tropica and available treatment 
options, malaria diagnostics must be sought without delay. Advice on malaria diagnostic options for 
patients outside of special isolation units can be found in appendix F. 
But differential diagnosis also includes the following infections: Other viral hemorrhagic fevers (such 
as yellow fever, Lassa fever, dengue fever, some Hantavirus infections, crimean-congo fever, 
Marburg fever), hepatitis A virus infections, typhoid, plague, rickettsioses, meningococcal and other 
septicemias, leptospirosis, hemorrhagic forms of relapsing fever, shigellosis and even some 
intoxications. Early phase non-specific symptoms can be caused by influenza, noro virus or harmless 
infections. Co-infections with multiple pathogens are possible.  





In the event of a probable case of EVD (see chapter 5.1) local health authorities order appropriate 
isolation of this patient, if necessary after consultation with Medical Competence and Treatment 
Centers. For probable EVD cases, laboratory diagnostics should be carried out in a BSL-4 laboratory 
(addresses see appendix G). For asymptomatic contacts laboratory investigations for Ebola virus are 
not indicated.  
For probable EVD cases, routine laboratory diagnostics (e.g. clinical chemistry) and specific 
laboratory tests for differential diagnosis (e.g. for malaria) should be performed accordingly in a 
special isolation unit (point-of-care diagnostics, “small series” of diagnostic tests). 
If rarely diagnostics are necessary to be carried out for a patient outside of a special isolation unit, 
procedure should be agreed upon with the attending physician, the local health authorities and 
potentially with the Medical Competence and Treatment Center.  
Emergency laboratory diagnostics (routine laboratory) for an isolated patient can also be carried out 
outside of the context of a special isolation unit as point-of-care diagnostics. In case the probable 
case is confirmed, the equipment used must be disinfected properly or, failing this, be disposed of 
accordingly. Personal protective equipment according to chapter 7.2.3.2 has to be used. 
5.3.1	 Sample	Taking	
In order to confirm or rule out EVD in a probable case, or to document the recovery process, 
samples must be taken from the patient for laboratory investigation. During sample taking any risk 
to the personnel taking the sample is to be minimized. Based on the necessary protective measures, 
it is recommended to take samples primarily at Medical Competence and Treatment Centers.  
Procedure	
 Prior to shipping samples from a patient with probable EVD, the diagnostic laboratory 
(addresses of the laboratories see appendix G) is to be contacted regarding the types and 
number of samples needed and to consult about shipment details.  
 Documentation by a complete protocol of specimen collection (including persons and 
times).  
 Collection of patient samples in a case of probable or confirmed EVD must be performed 
wearing appropriate PPE (see chapter 7.2.3.2).  
 Specific requirements of the sampling technique and of hygiene standards necessitate 
standard operating procedures and practical exercises by those physicians and nursing 
personnel taking the samples.  
 When using pointed and sharp medical devices in sampling, tools provided with safety 
features (“safety tools” with automatic safety mechanism) must be used (see appendix H 
section 4.2.5 paragraph 3 ff.).  
 Sample materials: the preferred material for primary diagnostics is serum or EDTA whole 
blood (2 vials), to document recovery also urine, stools, sweat, swabs from conjunctiva or 
oral mucosa.  




It must be ensured that the transport of samples runs smoothly and safely in order to reach a rapid 
clarification by laboratory diagnostics. At the same time, any hazard posed by improperly packaged 
sample material must be prevented.  
Procedure	(see	also	appendix	G)	
 Prior to shipping samples from a patient with a probable EVD, the diagnostic laboratory 
(addresses of the laboratories see appendix G) is to be contacted in order to announce 
samples and to consult about shipment details.  
 A complete transport protocol (including persons, state of the samples and times) is to be 
kept.  
 Shipment of diagnostic samples from a probable EVD case as UN 2814 (class 6.2 category 
A) according to ADR (European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road); packing instruction P620 designated “Infectious substances 
affecting humans UN 2814”. 
 Attach the biohazard symbol required for dangerous goods class 6.2; in addition, the 
information “If packaging is damaged or contents released inform health authorities” can 
be placed.  
 The submitter is the person responsible for announcing the shipment of the sample, its 
proper classification and adhering to the transportation directives; in case of doubt it is the 
head of the institution of the submitter.  
 The laboratory acknowledges the arrival of the specimen by contacting the attending 
physician/medical officer and the submitter immediately after receipt of the specimen.  
 Means of transportation and location of the diagnostic laboratory should be selected in 
such a way that the sample will arrive at the laboratory within six hours.  
 Packaging (P620 for infectious substances according to UN 2814)  
- Triple packaging system, consisting of  
1. Leak-proof primary container,  
2. Leak-proof secondary packaging, 
3. Rigid outer shipping package.  
For liquid materials (e.g. blood) absorbent material in sufficient quantity to absorb the 
entire liquid, must be placed between the primary container(s) and the secondary 
packaging. If multiple primary containers are placed in one secondary container, they must 
be separated from each other so that they are not touching. 
- Certified packaging is available at specialist shops or is provided by the courier. 
 The transport is carried out, for example, by the companies World Courier (Germany) 
GmbH, or CMK-Logistic Breisach, or other suppliers trained in ADR transportation. In 
case prompt transport cannot be guaranteed, it can be carried out potentially as an 
emergency transport, e.g. using emergency medical services, fire services or police 
(procedure is to be agreement in advance). Emergency transport intended to save human 
lives or protect the environment is exempted from ADR regulations provided that all 




Laboratory diagnostics for Ebola viruses in probable cases and confirmed cases of EVD should be 
performed in a BSL-4 laboratory (addresses of the laboratories see appendix G). Preliminary 
diagnostics for suspected cases of EVD (see below) can also be performed in an appropriate BSL-3 
laboratory (TRBA 100 4.4.1 (4)).  
Procedure	
 Diagnostics usually consists of real-time PCR for the detection of virus genome in blood 
(serum or plasma) during the acute phase of the disease.  
 Detection of specific antibodies (IgM, IgG) is possible using immunofluorescence, ELISA 
and neutralization tests, but results of these tests have no purpose as acute phase 
diagnostics.  
 Confirmation diagnostics of a positive primary real-time PCR result is done through PCR 
amplification of an additional region on the virus genome with the same nucleic acid 
sample or by sequencing of the PCR product. 
 For confirmation purposes it is not necessary to propagate the virus. This can only be 
done using non-inactivated patient material and therefore requires a BSL 4 (laboratories 
addresses of the laboratories see appendix G). Propagation of the virus can be attempted 
in order to characterize the virus further. In general, propagation of Ebola viruses plays 
only a minor role in primary diagnostics. 
 If the confirmation test is negative, the analysis of an Ebola virus infection is repeated 
using a retained sample.  
 Results can be expected within 6–8 hours after arrival of the sample at the diagnostic 
laboratory, provided that there are no unexpected technical problems. 
Primary	orientation	diagnostics	of	an	Ebola	virus	infection	in	an	appropriate	BSL3 
laboratory		
In case orientation diagnostics are required outside of aBSL-4 laboratory, this should be arranged by 
consultation with the local health authority and, if necessary, a Medical Competence and Treatment 
Center.  
Such primary diagnostic analysis using real-time PCR can be attributed to BSL 3 according to the 
Biological Agents Ordinance (BioStoffV) in conjunction with the TRBA 100 “Protective measures for 
activities involving biological agents in laboratories” (GMBl. number 51/52 from October 17., 2013, 
page 1010-1042; 1st amendments: GMBl. 2014 number 38 from June 30th, 2014, page 814):  
“4.4.1 … (4) If an infection with a biological agent of risk group 4 is suspected, all indicative 
examinations of the primary sample with material that has not been inactivated must be conducted 
at least under the conditions of protection level 3.” 
Further information is available in appendix I. 
Orientation diagnostics for probable cases of EVD in BSL-3 laboratories can be performed if for 
example the suspicion cannot be ruled out otherwise (addresses of the laboratories see appendix 
G).  
Suitable laboratories are those that fulfil the following conditions: 
 Operation of a virological BSL-3 laboratory ensuring the protection of the personnel,  
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 Experience in molecular diagnostics of viral diseases,  
 Use of commercially available quality controlled kits for the detection of Ebola virus RNA, 
which contain an extraction and amplification control (e.g. from Altona Diagnostics, Roche 
Diagnostics etc.),  
 Successful participation in external quality control trials regarding Ebola virus PCR 
diagnostics.  
Simultaneously to the confirmation tests, in the case of a positive preliminary result, an aliquot of 
the retained sample is sent to the Consiliary Laboratory for Filoviruses, Institute of Virology, Philipps 
University Clinics, Marburg, or to the National Reference Centre for Tropical Infectious Agents, 
Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine, Hamburg. 
5.3.4	 Report	on	diagnostic	findings	/	assessment		
Depending on the time of specimen taking from a suspected case, the following algorithms lead to 
these results:  
1. The blood sample was taken > 48 hours after onset of symptoms consistent with EVD:  
 Primary test and confirmation diagnostics are positive:  
→ Confirmed case of EVD.  
 Primary test is negative:  
→ Ebola virus infection is not detected.  
2. The blood sample was taken ≤ 48 hours after the onset of symptoms consistent with EVD:  
 Primary test and confirmation diagnostics are positive:  
→ Confirmed case of EVD.  
 Primary test is negative and the patient continues to meet the criteria of a probable 
case:  
→Differential diagnostics should be performed.  
→Until 48 hours since symptom onset has passed, the patient continues to be 
isolated, but not necessarily in a special isolation unit (see chapter 7.2.2 and 
chapter 7.2.3). (The first negative test result lowers the probability of the 
symptoms being those of EVD significantly, so that in certain cases (e.g. upon 
acute recovery from symptoms) patients can be isolated outside of the special 
isolation unit). For patient care the PPE listed in chapter 7.2.3.2 has to be used.    
→Regardless of a laboratory confirmed differential diagnosis, an additional patient 
sample, taken at the earliest on the 3rd day (> 48 hours) after onset of symptoms 
consistent with EVD, should be tested for Ebola virus. 
Primary test of this sample is negative in the PCR:  
→ Ebola virus infection is not detected.  
Primary test and confirmation diagnostics are positive:  
→ Confirmed case of EVD. 
5.3.5	 Reporting	Results	
Reporting of the laboratory results (negative and positive) must be done as soon as possible as they 




 Immediate report of the laboratory results (negative and positive) to the sender/attending 
physician, because the results are relevant for further measures. They in turn notify the 
local health authorities according to § 6 paragraph 1 number 1g IfSG.  
 Laboratories notify a positive result to the local health authorities according to § 7 
paragraph 1 number 12 IfSG.  
6.	 Assessment	of	Potential	Further	Spread		
Should either cases of EVD appear in Germany or the situation change otherwise, the assessment of 
risk of spread is to be conducted by the local health authorities in cooperation with state and federal 
authorities, in order for appropriate infection control measures to be implemented. State health 
authorities transmit risk assessments and appropriate updates to the RKI. 
Procedure	
 Local health authority: Data entry and electronic transmission of probable and confirmed 
cases and possibly number of contacts daily via the state health authority to the RKI. 
 On the basis of available data and information, RKI may compose a situation report to be 





Only early recognition and notification of a case of EVD allow for timely implementation of 
comprehensive protective measures.  
Procedure	
 According to § 6 Nr. 1 IfSG, physicians have to notify by name any patient suspected or 
confirmed to suffer from a viral hemorrhagic fever, or to have died of one to the local 
health authority. Laboratories are similarly required according to § 7 Nr. 1 IfSG to notify by 
name any patient with direct or indirect diagnosis of acute Ebola virus infection. These 
notifications need to be received by the local health authority within 24 hours after the 
physician comes to raise the suspicion of EVD. According to § 11 and § 12 IfSG these 
notifications are then further transmitted electronically to the state health authorities and 
the RKI. 
 According to the German Law on IHR Implementation (2005) Law (IGV-
Durchführungsgesetz - IGV-DG) pilots in command of aircraft (§ 11 IGV-DG) and officers 
in command of ships (§ 16 IGV-DG) are also required to notify such cases. This is the case 
for any person aboard with signs of having an infectious disease posing a substantial 
threat to public health, or that there are other indications pointing towards a substantial 
threat to public health aboard. 
 If a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, according to article 1 section 1 in 
appendix 2 of the International Health Regulations (IHR) of 23 May 2005 (officially 
published in Germany in BGBl. 2007 II p. 930) is on hand, according to § 12 IfSG the local 
health authority without undue delay transmits information about incident probable cases, 
measures taken around it, and any other information necessary to assess the situation 
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(e.g. the number of contact persons) to the appropriate state health authority and on to 
the RKI. To avoid reception delays, the RKI recommends for the sender to announce any 
§ 12 notification concurrently by telephone. 
 Aside from laboratory confirmed cases or deaths, transmission according to § 12 IfSG 
specifically also includes probable cases without laboratory confirmation. The local health 
authority without undue delay informs the state health authority which in turn informs the 
RKI. The RKI evaluates the available information and further transmits it according to the 
IHR within 24 hours of evaluation via the German national IHR focal point (GMLZ) to the 
WHO. According to EU 1082/2013/EU the information is also passed to the European 
Commission and the other EU member states.  
7.1.2	 Measures	regarding	Contacts	
For targeted intervention, all contact persons of a confirmed case of EVD – and possibly even of any 
probable case of EVD – need to be ascertained. To comprehensively prevent spread of infection, 
contact persons must be ascertained without delay.  
All persons shall be ascertained, who had direct contact with the EVD patient after onset of 
symptoms, and all those who may have come in contact with infectious materials from the case, 
including family members, medical staff, laboratory staff, flight passengers (those having sat one 
seat removed from the case in any direction including across the aisle as well as attending crew and 
anybody else with direct contact).  
Especially body fluids and excretions (blood, urine, vomitus etc.) are highly contagious on direct 
contact. Contact persons ascertained through case questioning and other research are to be 
immediately informed of their contact status. 
Vorgehen	
 Local health authority: Query EVD patient regarding onset of symptoms and all of his/her 
contacts since symptom onset. Consider other sources of information on contacts. 
 Local health authority: Query and class all contacts regarding their exposure risk category 
(see below “Classification of persons according to their risk of exposure”) and list 
them (appendices K and L), 
 Local health authority: Inform ascertained contacts about required rules of conduct: 
- Inform them about their risk of Ebola virus infection, 
- Advise them to self-monitor for any symptoms, 
- Explain, that until the maximum incubation period of 21 days after the last contact has 
passed, they will - depending on their risk exposure - either be daily questioned about 
the development of symptoms, especially fever, or asked to document their own 
health status and report to the local health authority accordingly. 
 Local health authority: Consider infection control measures according to §§ 28-31 IfSG. 
 States, RKI: Upon any state’s request, an RKI team of intervention epidemiologists can 
assist state and local authorities (see Coordination Regulation / Koordinierungs-VWV 
according to § 5 IfSG).  
Classification	of	persons	according	to	their	risk	of	exposure	
High risk of exposure 
Any person who during the past 21 days has had: 
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 A percutaneous or mucous membrane exposure to Ebola virus containing body fluids or 
tissue from a case of EVD or a person who died from EVD,  
 Any unprotected direct contact with blood or other body fluids (including soiled clothing or 
fomites) of a case of EVD or a person who died from EVD, 
 Any unprotected direct contact to any body of a dead person, e.g. during funeral rituals, or 
to fruit bats, other bats, non-human primates (e.g. bush meat) in an area with ongoing 
Ebola virus transmission (see appendix A) 
Intermediate risk of exposure 
Any person who during the past 21 days did not have a high risk exposure but without appropriate 
PPE: 
 Treated, nursed or physically examined (e.g. measured temperature or blood pressure) any 
case of EVD who was so far only febrile (i.e. not yet very ill),  
 Had contact (< 1m) with a case of EVD unaware of direct body contact or contact with 
body fluids (including household members, aircraft passengers/ attending crew1), 
 Had contact to potentially Ebola virus containing clothing or fomites. 
Very low risk of exposure (exposure only while wearing appropriate PPE)2 
Persons who in the past 21 days were always following appropriate protective measures while having 
contact with: 
 Cases of EVD, those suspected to have EVD or those having died of EVD, 
 Body fluids of cases of EVD, those suspected to have EVD or those having died of EVD or  
 Ebola virus containing materials or infected animals. 
No discernible risk of exposure 
Examples of persons without discernible risk of exposure include: 
 Those having had contact with an asymptomatic person, who is considered a contact to a 
case of EVD,  
 Those who had contact to a case of EVD before this person developed symptoms, 
 Those who have been to areas affected by an EVD outbreak but without any of the above 
mentioned risks of exposure, 
 Those who left EVD outbreak affected areas more than 21 days ago,  
 Those who have recently stayed in African countries unaffected by EVD outbreaks. 
Recommendations	regarding	persons	with	an	exposure	risk		
High risk of exposure 
These persons have a high risk of having acquired infection. It is recommended to quarantine these 
persons for 21 days after their last exposure in an appropriate location selected by the local health 
                                                     
1 Air passengers having sat one seat removed from the case in any direction including across the aisle , those 
with other direct contact as well as crew members attending to the case. 
2 Since even under appropriate protective measures an unrecognized exposure cannot be completely excluded 
(e.g. due to procedural mistakes), a small risk of exposure remains. Thus this group of persons is included in 
this overview (not as contacts, but as persons which a potential very low risk of exposure). 
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authority conforming to § 30 IfSG. They should be queried daily by the local health authority 
regarding the development of any symptoms, especially fever (see appendix L).  
Appropriate post-exposure prophylaxis can be considered. All approaches so far are experimental 
and ought to be considered on a case-by-case basis (see chapter 7.2.5.) 
Intermediate risk of exposure 
These persons should be monitored according to § 29 IfSG. The local health authority moreover 
assesses, whether measures according to § 28 IfSG are warranted. It may order these contacts to 
minimize their own respective contacts during the potential incubation period and to abstain from 
travel outside of Germany.  
These persons should monitor themselves for any symptoms, especially fever, for 21 days after the 
last contact (see appendix L). The local health authority should contact them regularly to ask for the 
results of this self-monitoring according to § 29 section 2 IfSG (appendix L). 
Very low risk of exposure (exposure only while wearing appropriate PPE)  
Under actual working conditions, especially in patient care, risk of exposure is not zero due to 
potentially unrecognized mistakes committed while attempting to follow procedure, even with 
adequate training. Consequently, all persons who were only exposed while following adequate 
precautions are also recommended to self-monitor their health status, including twice-daily 
temperature taking and documentation of any arising symptoms (see appendix M).  
The employer or deploying organization ought to guide and support self-monitoring through 
occupational health services. The latter is recommended to contact the local health authority to 
synchronize procedure. Persons returning from endemic areas are generally recommended to 
contact their local health authority themselves and to plan reciprocal reachability. 
Observation according to § 29 IfSG or quarantine according to § 30 IfSG is not recommended for this 
group. Under special circumstances, the local health authority may decide to vary from this 
recommendation. Work abstinence for 21 days after the last contact is not generally recommended 
on infection control grounds. However, on a case-by-case basis such work abstinence can be granted 
by the employer or deploying organization for other reasons (e.g. for rest, avoidance of harmless 
false alarm-generating infections), especially for medical personnel involved in direct patient care, 
when they return to Germany from very taxing missions in the African outbreak areas.  
No discernible risk of exposure 
No measures required. 
Procedure,	should	a	contact	person	become	symptomatic	
Persons with intermediate or high risk of exposure developing any symptoms compatible with 
EVD within the 21 days maximum incubation period should be considered probable cases of EVD 
unless such an infection can be ruled out by laboratory diagnostics (for measures, see chapter 5.1).  
These persons are to be instructed beforehand to isolate themselves from others within the context 
of their then current location, unless they are already quarantined according to § 30 IfSG. They are to 
immediately inform the local health authority. Suspicion of EVD should be defined in a sensitive way 
in symptomatic persons with known contacts, including the presence of just an elevated temperature 
in conjunction with other symptoms typical for early EVD.  
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The local health authority should contact the proper Medical Competence and Treatment Center and 
the appropriate state health authority without delay, to coordinate any further actions (e.g. patient 
transport and hospitalization, laboratory diagnostics). 
Symptomatic persons, who had contact to probable or confirmed cases of EVD, or those having died 
of EVD, only while wearing appropriate personal protective equipment do not automatically 
constitute probable cases. Nevertheless, for any symptoms compatible with EVD developing within 
the 21 days maximum incubation period they are to self-isolate and immediately inform the local 
health authority by phone. Case specifics and an extensive patient history are essential for the risk 
assessment. The local health authority decides whether to consider the case probable and to trigger 
appropriate measures (see appendix M).   
Advice	
Should it be necessary to call emergency services, the patient or any person assisting (e.g. a family 
member) need to alert the emergency services operator at the earliest opportunity of the status of 
that patient as a contact to a case of EVD. 
7.1.3	 Screening	
Entry screening for fever and questioning of travelers at points of entry are theoretically possible. 
However, the benefit of entry screening is judged to be very limited (see assessment of the European 




To prevent introduction of Ebola virus, regulations regarding import of animals and animal products 
are to be followed: (http://www.zoll.de/DE/Unternehmen/Warenverkehr/Einfuhr-aus-einem-Nicht-
EU-Staat/Einschraenkungen/Waren/Tiere-und-Produkte-daraus/tiere-und-produkte-
daraus_node.html).  
It is possible, that infected dead animals or their meat (“bush meat”) are illegally imported into 
Germany. This process conveys risk of infection for custom officers and others supervising import 
and transit of animal products at international transitions points (airports, ports). Altogether the risk 
for Germany is considered to be small. However, this risk is thought to be minimal for Germany. 




 Transport of patients (confirmed and probable cases) is conducted under guidance and in 
close consultation/agreement with local health authorities and possibly state health 
authorities and Medical Competence and Treatment Centers. 
 The selected facility (special treatment center or under rare circumstances also regular 
hospitals) must be informed immediately. Due to localization of the seven special 
treatment centers across Germany patient transport to a special isolation unit should not 
take longer than four to five hours. 
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 An ambulance suitable for transporting highly infectious patients should be requested. 
Request can be made through local emergency services switchboard or the Medical 
Competence and Treatment Centers. 
 Should such a special ambulance vehicle not be available (e.g. because of urgent hospital 
administration), a regular ambulance that is cored can be utilized. The windows separating 
cockpit and patient area need to be kept closed. 
 Transfer of patient is best done accompanied by a team of the designated Medical 
Competence and Treatment Center. 
 Treatment of patient during transport should only be performed by experienced personnel 
that is equipped with adequate PPE (see chapter 7.2.3.2) 
 During transport the patient is provided with a mask covering mouth and nose (as long as 
this is tolerable for the patient), hood and protective gown, in order to minimize 
environmental contamination of the vehicle. 
 After patient transport all surfaces of ambulance must be wiped with disinfectant which 
has been proven to be effective with regard to category AB (see. 
http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Krankenhaushygiene/Desinfektionsmittel/Desinfekti
onsmittellist/Desinfektionsmittelliste_node.html); if appropriate further measures lie 
within the decision of local health authority (see § 18 IfSG). 
 For disinfection procedure and donning and doffing of PPE see chapter 7.2.3 and chapter 
7.2.4. 
 Confirmed EVD cases and probable cases shall not be transported within the same vehicle 
at the same time or sequentially without in-between disinfection. This also applies to the 
transport of multiple probable cases. However, the probability of multiple probable or 
confirmed cases arising simultaneously at the same place is considered very low. 
 As helicopters cannot be disinfected without compromising on-board electronic systems 
and patient access in them is limited, EVD patient transport by helicopter at this time is 
not advisable and should be avoided. 
7.2.2	 Treatment	Unit	Requirements	
Treatment of probable cases and confirmed cases should be primarily carried out within the 
dedicated Medical Competence and Treatment Centers in special isolation units. The requirements 
of the Technical Rules for Biological Agents are to be fulfilled (see appendix H).  
Probable cases or already confirmed cases (the latter only under the rare circumstances that they are 
not transport competent, or where other unforeseen factors prevent transport) who need to be 
treated elsewhere than special isolation units, still need to be spatially isolated (“barrier nursing”: 
contact and aerosol isolation comparable to that applied to patients with open TB, even though in 
contrast to Mycobacterium tuberculosis Ebola virus is not transmitted by aerosols).  
The decision which institution can be considered for temporary treatment of non-transferable EVD 
patients is taken by the local health authorities or on the state level.  
The following minimum standards are mandatory:  
 The patient room has vestibule or another designated entry area separating clean from 
unclean areas. 
 This includes realization of: 
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- appropriate means for desinfection,  
- possibilities to safely don and doff PPE, and  
- options for safe collection and subsequent disposal of used PPE.  
 For all actions in the treatment area standard operating procedures need to be provided. 
This specifically pertains to the donning and doffing procedures for PPE, PPE 
decontamination including that for reusable PPE items such as boots, necessary 
disinfection and decontamination procedures, waste management, and accident 
emergency measures. 
 Staff needs to be instructed and trained in safe donning and doffing of PPE (regarding PPE 
see chapter 7.2.3.3).  
 Staff needs to be willing to examine and nurse EVD patients. A sufficient number of staff 
members needs to be available. 
 Point of care diagnostics (small diagnostic series) for infectious samples should be 
available within the isolation unit (standard diagnostics for clinical chemistry including 
blood counts, blood typing). 




Care of EVD patients (probable and confirmed cases) must be performed only by instructed and 
trained personnel. Such treatment should strive to minimize contact. Invasive procedures, especially 
outside of special isolation units, must be reduced to the absolute minimum required. Basic 
protective procedures such as complying with hygienic standards and safe waste management 
(including solid and liquid waste) are mandatory for treatment of all patients.  
If sampling from or treatment of patients requires the use of sharp instruments, instruments with 
automatic safety mechanisms are to be used (see appendix H No 4.2.5 (3 ff)).  
General	Notice	
Comply with hygienic standards and minimize contact.  
Special	Notice	
In case of close contact (physical exam, medical treatment, patient transport) with probable and 
confirmed cases, the following rules and procedures of occupational health and safety need to be 
obeyed. These rules and procedures are based on TRBA 250. The measures outlined hereafter have 
been agreed with the coordination unit and the ad-hoc Ebola working group of the Committee for 
Biological Agents in the workspace (ABAS).  
Depending on the situation, the following three concepts are specified: 
1. Patient care in special isolation units, 
2. Temporary isolation of patients outside of special isolation units, and 
3. Patient care outside of special isolation units (when patient transport is not an option). 
7.2.3.1	 Patient	Care	in	a	Special	Isolation	Units		




A probable case newly detected is at first to remain in his or her current locale. It is assumed that the 
time in this locale will be short and only the most necessary procedures involving direct contact with 
the patient are to be conducted prior to transfer to a special isolation unit. 
The designated personal protective equipment shall ensure that skin and mucous membranes are 
protected against pathogen contact. All skin and mucous membranes ought to be covered. The 
material properties of the personal protective equipment should allow for the reduction of visible 
contamination with patient body fluids by wipe disinfection. Additional measures regarding hygiene 
and waste management are addressed separately (see chapter 7.2.7). 
For primary care of patients in hospitals, especially in emergency departments, at doctors' surgeries, 
with rescue services, and on local health authority premises the following minimum protective 
equipment ought to be available: 
 Respiratory protection  
FFP3- half-mask according to EN 149:2001, preferably additionally according to EN 
14683:2014 (splash guard IIR)  
Technical justification of the ABAS for the application/use of FFP3-half-masks: Although it 
is assumed that the Ebola virus is not aerogenic (non- transmissible as aerosol by particles 
<5μm), infectious particles might originate upon release of body fluids by the patient (e.g. 
in consequence of vomiting or medical measures) that could lead to infection if medical 
staff is in close contact to the patient. Therefore, from a preventive perspective, respiratory 
protection is necessary. Surgical masks (e.g. mouth/nose protection) are not respiratory 
protective equipment; neither filter performance nor the fit on the face provide sufficient 
protection. 
 Eye and face protection  
Protective goggles (anti-fog, with side shields, CE Kat. II, EN 166:2002) as used in 
endoscopic practices and a face shield (preferably according to EN 166:2002). 
 Hand protection 
In order to protect the hands, two pairs of liquid-proof gloves with protection against 
mechanical and biological risks (CE Cat. III, e.g. according to DIN EN 420, 388, 374, AQL ≤ 
1.5) are mandatory. Gloves should have cuffs to ensure a sufficient overlap to the clothing 
mentioned below.  
 Body protection 
Protective equipment has to consist of liquid-tight material allowing for safe doffing. 
Disposable suits Category III (preferably Type 3B) are recommended in combination with a 
disposable plastic apron. If they are not available, the institution is obliged to provide the 
same safety level using other means, e.g. with floor-length long-sleeved gowns with back 
lock made of liquid-tight material (e.g. according to EN 13795 High Performance) in 
combination with a disposable plastic apron as additional splash protection. Disposable 
suits ought to have a hood. Hoodless suits are to be complemented with separate 
shoulder length head hood.  
 Foot protection  
Disposable over boots of liquid-proof material or rubber boots. 





Probable EVD cases or already confirmed cases should be transferred as soon as possible to a 
special isolation unit for further treatment. 
7.2.3.3	 Patient	Care	Outside	of	Special	Isolation	Units	(when	patient	transport	is	not	an	
option)	
When a patient must be treated outside a specialized isolation unit for a longer period of time (e.g. 
when the patient is too sick to be transported) for comfort reasons fan-supported breathing 
protection (TH 3P, if disinfectants are used, with appropriate particle filter A, B, E or K) is 
recommended. 
Alternatively, full face masks (P3, if disinfectants are used additionally with appropriate particle filter 
A, B, E or K; see appendix H, Appendix 1, 1.4.1) can be used. Advantages are the lack of fan noise; a 
disadvantage is the reduced working time allowance. In any case appropriate physical fitness and 
minimally a 2-day practical and theoretical training is required.  
7.2.3.4	 Donning	and	Doffing	of	Personal	Protective	Equipment	
Protection against infections by personal protective equipment (PPE) is only guaranteed if it is 
correctly applied, worn, decontaminated, doffed and discarded. For this reason, regular exercises for 
the usage of PPE are necessary in order to avoid mistakes and resulting infection (see Appendix D). 
Procedure	
 Before PPE doffing, PPE disinfection is required.  
 In the context of confirmed cases of EVD full body decontamination must be performed. 
Donning and doffing of protective clothing and decontamination must be performed with 
the help of a second person (so called “buddy-system”). 
 In the context of probable cases of EVD after careful assessment full body 
decontamination may be considered unnecessary. In this case the PPE should be wipe-
disinfected with a sponge and appropriate disinfectants before doffing - especially areas of 
visible contamination (see appendix D). 
Decontamination	(Full	body	decontamination	and	decontamination	of	selected	areas,	
see	appendix	O)	
 Application of an at least limited virucidal disinfectant while maintaining specified 
exposure times. 
 The disinfectant should be collected – either with sufficient absorbent towels or in a pan – 
and should be disposed of appropriately (see chapter 7.2.4.8). 
 Regarding the disinfection of PPE specific details are provided in the appendix of the RKI 




 After disinfection, protective clothing must be taken off in a way that the outside of the 
clothing does not contaminate the skin of the person ("peeling off”), meaning that the 
inside of the protective clothing is supposed to be outside after doffing.  
 Gloves have to be doffed/disposed of after touching the mask. Then hands must be 
disinfected and washed, and the gloves must be replaced. 
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 When leaving the contaminated room protective clothing must be taken off and prepared 
for disposal in the vestibule. Either the protective clothing is autoclaved in appropriate 
bags according EAK 180103 or supplied as infectious waste in appropriate packing after 
(thermal) waste disinfection to waste management/disposal (see chapter 7.2.4.6).  
 Before doffing, gloves should be disinfected with a hand disinfectant with at least limited 
virucidal efficacy. 
 After doffing of gloves, hands should be disinfected with a hand disinfectant with at least 
limited virucidal efficacy. 
 All potentially contaminated surfaces, e.g. in the vestibule, must be disinfected by a careful 
wipe disinfection (limited virucidal or virucidal efficacy). 
Further information is provided in appendix D.  
7.2.4	 Required	Disinfection	Measures	/	Waste	Management	
Procedure	(see	appendix	O)	
The procedures in the special isolation unit are governed by TRBA 250 (see appendix H) and other 
regulations, e.g. for protection against infection. The following remarks mainly refer to the procedure 
outside the special isolation unit (see appendix O). 
 All measures must be carried out in accordance with the local health authority and if 
applicable with the Medical Competence and Treatment Center for patients with highly 
contagious infections. 
 The environment in which the potentially contagious patient has stayed (e.g. apartment, 
car, doctor's office) and where a direct contact with body fluids or with the patient's skin 
occurred or could have occurred, should pending receipt of the secured diagnosis be 
blocked and controlled. 
 If this is not possible or a case of EVD is confirmed, the decontamination should be 
carried out using disinfection measures as described below. 
 In this context the access to the respective area is to be blocked and the number of 
persons in this area must be restricted to the smallest necessary number. 
 Appropriate opportunities for decontamination of each other and for changing PPE need 
to be set up at the entrance to the area. 
 Wipe disinfection of the contaminated areas listed above and of the PPE is the measure of 
choice. Only in exceptional circumstances, where not all contaminated areas can be 
disinfected by a surface disinfection, additional room disinfection by evaporation of 
formaldehyde or hydrogen peroxide should be taken into consideration. 
 Contaminated objects, where disinfection cannot be assured entirely are to be discarded 
together with used and decontaminated PPE, according to waste code number 180103*. 
 Disinfectants with proven, at least limited virucidal effectiveness (active against enveloped 
viruses; see document “Testing and Labeling of Disinfectant Activity against Viruses“) are 
sufficient for disinfection of contamination with Ebola virus. Disinfectants with virucidal 






 Disinfectants of type AB from the list of RKI tested and approved disinfectants and 
disinfection methods (short "RKI list") or the disinfectant list of the Association for 
Applied Hygiene (short "VAH list") with limited (or full) virucidal activity are appropriate in 
this instance. If the local health authority officially orders disinfection, it is mandatory to 




 Regarding disinfection of personal protective equipment specific information is also 




 Staff engaged in disinfection activities must wear personal protective equipment according 
to a situational risk assessment. In case of a high risk potential, e.g. due to massive 
contamination with bodily fluids or for confirmed Ebola virus infection, personal protective 
equipment as specified in chapter 7.2.3.2 must be used. Personnel must be specially 




 While caring for a probable or confirmed case of Ebola virus infection, personal protective 
equipment including gloves must be worn. After doffing of gloves or after any 
contamination, hands are to be disinfected with a hand disinfectant with proven at least 
limited virucidal effectiveness (virucidal disinfectants can also be used). For practical 
reasons, these disinfectants can also be used for disinfection of other accidently 
contaminated areas of the skin. 
- Further information about this is available in the RKI list, section 2.3, and the VAH list 
as well as in the recommendations of the “Commission for Hospital Hygiene and 






 For disinfection of mucous membranes octenidine dihydrochloride /phenoxyethanol- or 
chlorhexidine-containing drugs or povidone-iodine complexes (7.5%) can be used, 
according to their certified areas of application e.g. Octenisept, Skinsept mucosa, Braunol. 





 All surfaces clearly or potentially contaminated with body fluids, as well as skin contact 
areas are to be disinfected by thorough wiping with approved disinfectants according to 
the RKI list, section 2.2 or the VAH list (see above).  
 For conducting surface disinfection, reference is made to the recommendation of the 
Commission of Hospital Hygiene and Infection Prevention on “Hygiene requirements for 
surface cleaning and disinfection”.  
- http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Krankenhaushygiene/Kommission/Downloads/
Flaeche_Rili.html 
 Wearing the required protective clothing, visible contamination (e.g. with blood, vomitus) 
has to be absorbed into a single-use cloth drenched with surface disinfectant and after the 
required soaking time discarded as infectious waste according to waste code number 
180103* These areas should be wiped twice with disinfectants prior to an overall surface 
disinfection (see document Decontamination/disinfection in biological threat situations): 
- http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Biosicherheit/Dekontamination/Dekontaminati
on_node.html 
 Immediately after discharge or death of a patient a final disinfection has to be performed 
by abrasive wipe disinfection of all accessible surfaces and objects (incl. bed frames and 
mattresses with the use of protective covers, otherwise thermal disinfection). 
7.2.4.3	 Disinfection	of	Medical	Devices	(Instruments	and	Equipment)	
Procedure	(see	appendix	O)	
 All instruments and technical equipment contaminated or potentially contaminated with 
body fluids from patients with EVD are to be disinfected individually and specifically. 
Depending on the reprocessing instruction of the respective instrument or equipment, a 
surface disinfection (by wiping) or an instrument disinfection (by dunking) needs to be 
performed. Contaminated devices which cannot be fully disinfected are to be discarded 
according to waste code number 180103*. 
 Advice on the reprocessing of medical devices can be found in the recommendations of 
the Commission for Hospital Hygiene and Infectious Disease Prevention at the Robert 
Koch Institute and the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices on “Hygiene 
Requirements for Reprocessing of Medical Devices”. 
- http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Krankenhaushygiene/Aufb_MedProd/Aufb_Me
dProd_node.html 
 Disinfection of large equipment has to be individually planned. It depends on the 
estimated degree of contamination and should be performed in accordance with the 
general rules for disinfection and the manufacturer’s specifications. In addition, 
fumigation with formaldehyde or hydrogen peroxide is possible. If applicable, special 
precaution needs to be provided for tubing and liquid systems that will be a) emptied and 
b) disinfected. In case equipment must be transported before decontamination, e.g. to the 
autoclave room, liquid systems must be emptied in advance, disinfected and emptied 
again. 
 An individual approach is also necessary for analytical equipment (e.g. in vitro 
diagnostics). A wipe or spray disinfection is NOT sufficient, as liquids can reach 
inaccessible areas (corners, gaps, joints) in the equipment. A fumigation procedure is 
more appropriate and needs to be validated for the individual type of device. 
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 For equipment and machines that are used for primary diagnosis and sample preparation 
under BSL 3 conditions, the conditions mentioned in the first paragraph of this section 
apply. Patient samples which, after proper treatment with virus lysis buffer (AVL buffer) are 
e.g. subjected to PCR analysis and are subsequently controlled and transferred to BSL 2 in 
new sample tubes, do not pose risk of contamination for the analysis instrument (PCR 




 In the exceptional case that it is not possible to clean all contaminated areas by surface 
disinfection, a room disinfection using formaldehyde or hydrogen peroxide vapors (RKI 
list, section 3.3) can be considered in addition to the surface disinfection. 
7.2.4.5	 Laundry	Disinfection	
Procedure	(see	appendix	O)	
 During the care for probable and confirmed cases of Ebola virus infection, single-use bed 
linens should be used and subsequently discarded. Potentially contaminated clothing and 
other potentially contaminated laundry needs to be discarded using appropriate packing 
procedures and materials. 
7.2.4.6	 Waste	Disposal3	
Measures	and	recommendations	for	institutions	of	the	Health	Service	
 The waste, produced during the care for a probable or confirmed case of EVD should if 
possible be inactivated in close proximity to the place where the waste was generated, 
according to the biomaterial regulation (BioStoffV). 
 Currently, medical facilities are only in individual cases equipped with autoclaves. For 
planned refurnishing or re-fitting, disinfection systems must fulfill certain requirements, as 
specified in the Federal/State Waste Committee (LAGA) execution guidelines (see 
appendix P). As stated in the guidelines “the disinfection systems are to be used 
according to the operating parameters specified for the disinfection of waste. This mode of 
operation is to be documented. The operation is only permissible, if the operator can 
provide proof that the system is in constructional and functional accordance with DIN 
58949 or other specifications, as determined for the implementation into the RKI list 
according to § 18 IfSG and that the system is tested and operated according to these 
rules.” 
 Additional information on methods of disinfection can be found in the list of RKI tested 
and approved disinfectants and disinfection methods, section 3.4  
- http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Krankenhaushygiene/Desinfektionsmittel/Desi
nfektionsmittelliste.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
                                                     
3 Developed by a working group with experts from RKI, Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing 
(BAM), Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA), DFV, 
Association of the Chemical Industry e. V. (VCI) and additional experts (Last updated November 2014). 
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 In special isolation units double-door autoclaves should preferably be present in order to 
allow on-site disinfection of waste generated by patient care (see also appendix H, 
attachment 1, section 1.2.6). 
 If necessary, when using stationary autoclaves, rules for the transport of infectious waste 
within the facility need be taken into consideration. 
 An alternative to stationary autoclaves can be mobile disinfection units installed on 
vehicles, which fulfill the respective specifications. Concepts for these have already existed 
for a while; however, these would need to be verified by potential supplier with regard to 
feasibility and would need to be implemented. Mobile disinfection units could be used e.g. 
on airports and treatment facilities, which are rarely confronted with the corresponding 
requirements of disposal.  
 In case the on-site inactivation of infectious waste is not possible due to technical or 
logistical reasons, the waste needs to be disposed in an appropriate manner outside of the 
place where it was generated. In this instance, the waste needs be burned in a special 
waste incineration plant that is approved for waste with waste code number 180103*.  
 For transportation to the special waste incineration plant, the waste has to be packed in 
accordance to ADR and packing instruction P620 with the label UN2814. For small 
amounts of materials, appropriate containers are approved by BAM. 
- http://www.tes.bam.de/de/service/aktuelles/Ebola_Verpackungen.pdf 
 It has, however, become apparent, that for larger quantities of infectious waste there are 
currently no sufficiently large containers available in Germany and other countries of the 
European Union, which are in compliance with packing instruction P620. For this reason, 
on 27.11.2014, Germany signed and enacted a multilateral agreement of member states of 
the European Union (see appendix Q). This agreement is limited until 31.12.2016 and 
provides an exemption for the packaging for shipment of waste that may be contaminated 
with Ebola viruses. The safety is ensured according to the packing instruction P620 by the 
application of a high-quality triple packaging. Generally, the packaging is comprised of:  
- Primary receptacle: 1H2/Y plastic drum with removable head hat meets the 
requirements of 4.1.1 and 4.1.3 ADR, internal volume up to 60 liters available for this 
purpose, opening diameter approx. 400 mm , leak-proof, lid preferably with adhesive 
seal, single-use closure (not to reopen), 
- Secondary packaging: PE bag with a material thickness of preferably 100 μm, but at 
least 75 μm, 
- Outer packaging: 1H2/X plastic drum with removable head and clamping ring closure, 
external dimensions approx. 500 mm diameter, 800 mm height. 
An exemplary instruction can be found in appendix R. 
 According to dangerous goods officer regulations (GBV), the sender (the hospital or 
medical facility) must appoint a dangerous goods officer before the first shipment. This 
can be a demonstrably trained and certified internal employee, as well as an external 
dangerous goods officer with valid training certificate as a consultant. The dangerous 
goods officer shall assign all procedures described, instruct the involved parties and finally 
carefully monitor each operation 
 The sender of the infectious waste is also required to create a transport document for the 
carrier. An example can be found in appendix S.  
30 
 
 In health care facilities that take care of patients with EVD, a safety plan for the 
management of infectious waste containing with a high probability hemorrhagic fever 
viruses (such as Ebola virus) must be created. An example can be found in appendix T.   
Measures	and	Recommendations	on	the	Transport	of	Infectious	Waste	
 The transport of infectious substances is mainly regulated by ADR. The transport of non-
inactivated waste from confirmed hemorrhagic fever cases (such as EVD) is carried out as 
Class 6.2, Category A under UN-number 2814.  
 In Germany, appropriate companies, that can take over the proper and safe transport of 
infectious waste, are available and are usually already part of the waste management in the 
clinical practice. Prior to the transport of waste, appropriate arrangements for receiving 
must be made with a suitable special waste incineration plant. 
Measures	and	Recommendations	on	the	Incineration	of	Infectious	Waste		
 For the special waste incineration plants, which are approved for waste with waste code 
number 180103*, it can be assumed that the constructional and technical requirements for 
proper incineration are guaranteed. As an additional organizational measure a clear work 
instruction has to be established in the special waste incineration plants for a prompt and 
proper handling of hazardous waste with the identification UN 2814. It has to be taken into 
account: 
- That the sender uses multi-layer packaging that is safe and approved for the intended 
use, including a high resistance against mechanical strains. 
- That a timely incineration of these packages is performed. 
- That only barrel lifts or similar feeder equipment are used, which do not damage the 
waste containers. 
- That in the unlikely event of breakage or leakage of waste containers or other 
disorders, the affected area must be shut off and further measures must be 
established with the responsible local health authority. 
 The waste code number 180103* also includes waste potentially contaminated with 
pathogens causing viral hemorrhagic fever (including Ebola virus). From existing contracts 
or tender agreements with this waste code number, an obligation of disposal derives for 
the operator of the special waste incineration plant. The detailed description of the waste 
code number is regulated in the LAGA execution guideline M18, which is implemented in 
the majority of the federal states by decree (see appendix P). 
 For the incineration of waste from health institutions that is contaminated with risk group 
4 pathogens (such as Ebola virus), no special regulations in the special waste incineration 
plants are necessary in addition to those mentioned above. 
 Further technical information shall be made available to the operators during an 
information event in the near future, which will be organized by governmental agencies. 
7.2.4.7	 Waste	Water	Disposal	
Additional information can be found in appendix O. 
Procedure	for	Probable	Cases		
In the early stages of the disease only low levels of virus are shedded and furthermore a high dilution 
effect can be expected. Thus, waste water including feces and urine, which is generated during initial 
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care for a probable EVD case, can be discarded outside the special isolation unit via a separately 
used toilet into the normal wastewater system.  
In case a bedside commode or bedpan must be used due to limited mobility of the patient, this 
should preferably be performed with disposable equipment. The content can – using adequate 
personal protective equipment – be disposed of using the separately used (personalized) toilet. If no 
disposable equipment is available, the used material, after emptying via the toilet, is to be disinfected 
directly in the room using an appropriate container with disinfectant of type AB from the RKI list. The 
contaminated sanitary equipment is to be carefully disinfected.   
Procedure	for	Confirmed	Cases	
Temporary isolation outside special isolation units 
Waste water including feces and urine, which is generated during care for a confirmed case of EVD, 
has to be collected in suitable containers and a disinfectant of at least limited virucidal effectiveness, 
suitable for disinfection of excretions, has to be added in an effective concentration (primarily 
limewater according to the specifications of the RKI list of tested and approved disinfectants and 
disinfection methods; disinfectant type AB (RKI list, section 2.2)). Subsequently (after the end of the 
required soaking time) it can be discarded via a separately used fecal drain, if thermal inactivation is 
not possible. 
Feces and other body fluids which could not be collected, have first to be covered with a cloth or 
cellulose that are drenched in disinfectants and then safely absorbed and removed. 
Alternatively, excretions can be collected in containers containing suitable absorbent material (e.g. 
incontinence aids). The thus absorbed liquids are subsequently disposed of as infectious waste 
(waste code number 180103*) (see chapter Waste disposal above). 
In case sanitary facilities have already been used by the patients or if circumstances do not allow for 
another possibility, contaminated sanitary facilities need to be carefully disinfected. 
Special isolation units 
Waste water disposal in special isolation units is performed after appropriate inactivation and is 
regulated in TRBA 250, appendix 1. 
7.2.4.8	 Disposal	of	Used	Disinfectant	
Procedure	
 In case the used disinfectant was not diluted by during use and after a holding time that at 
least corresponds to the required soaking time for (limited) virucidal effectiveness, it can 
be assumed that no relevant pathogen concentrations remain. 
 Solid components (environmental dirt, organic material, especially patient excretions etc.) 
can affect the effectiveness of the disinfectant in the disinfectant- containing liquid after 
decontamination. Therefore, these residues should, if possible, be disposed in the same 
way as patient excretions in compliance with the appropriate protective measures. 
 The disposal of the used disinfectant is generally to be carried out in accordance with local 
official regulations according to the safety data sheet. Preferably, procedures are to be 
used, for which the used disinfectant can be disposed of via the drain / toilet (connected 





 If possible, contaminated areas are to be disinfected immediately using a disinfectant with 
proven at least limited virucidal effectiveness.  
 Hands are to be disinfected with a hand disinfectant with proven at least limited virucidal 
effectiveness (virucidal disinfectants can also be used). For practical reasons, these 
disinfectants can also be used for disinfection of other accidently contaminated areas of 
the skin. 
 Further information about this is available in the RKI list, section 2.3, and the VAH list as 
well as in the recommendations of the “Commission for Hospital Hygiene and Infectious 






 For disinfection of mucous membranes octenidine dihydrochloride /phenoxyethanol- or 
chlorhexidine-containing drugs or povidone-iodine complexes (7.5%) can be used, 
according to their certified areas of application e.g. Octenisept, Skinsept mucosa, Braunol. 
For the application on eyes 5% povidone-iodine complex is suitable.   
Post‐exposure	vaccination		
 Approaches for vaccines (e.g. administration of VSV-EBOV) are experimental. Their 
application needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis (see also chapter 7.2.6).  
Post‐exposure	antiviral	prophylaxis		
 Ribavirin is frequently used against other viral hemorrhagic fevers, but is NOT effective 
against Filoviruses.  
 The treatment with T-705 (Favipiravir) or other substances are purely experimental 
measures and so far only supported by data from animal studies. These substances are 
not approved as medication in Germany. However, their administration can be offered to 
patients in individual cases. Precondition is written documentation and education about 
the individual treatment attempt using an unlicensed medication. 
7.2.6	 Pre‐exposure	immunization	
Currently, several vaccines against Ebola virus infections are at different stages of development. 
Initial phase-I safety studies (e.g. cAd3-Ebola, VSV-EBOV) have started in several countries.    
First results from these studies are expected to be available in December 2014/January 2015. By then, 
the doses generating optimal immunogenicity should have become clear and possible specific 
intolerances correlating to the administration of these doses known. If the study meets the 




EVD patients are medically treated and isolated. Since there is currently no causal therapy available, 
patients suffering from EVD are mainly treated for their symptoms, especially considering 
homeostasis of fluids, electrolytes, and glucose.  
Supportive,	and	if	required,	intensive	medical	care	
Among others, the following measures are available:  
 Supportive and, if required, intensive medical care (intensive medical measures according 
to capacity, severity, and prognosis), 
 Diagnostics and anti-microbial therapy of co-infections, 
 Depending on the clinical condition (objectivized by suitable intensive care score) 
administration of intensive therapeutical measures at early stages, including: 
 cardiovascular support; 
 respiratory support;  
 organ replacement therapy (kidney, liver); 
 blood component therapy; 
 appropriate monitoring; 
 Hydration of the patient should be performed under cardiovascular and clinical-chemical 
monitoring. 
Specific	therapy	options		
 Ribavirin is used against other viral hemorrhagic fevers, but is NOT effective against 
Filoviruses.  
 The few specific medication trials are experimental. An overview is available in the WHO 
background document “Potential Ebola Therapies and Vaccines“ 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-new-interventions-02-sep-2014.pdf. 
Therapeutic	candidates	that	can	be	considered	for	a	therapy	of	EVD		
In Germany, so far no medication is licensed for the treatment of EVD. The administration of the 
following therapeutics can be offered to patients on a case-by-case basis. Precondition is written 
documentation and education about the individual treatment attempt using an unlicensed drug. 
In general – if available – the following candidates can be considered for the treatment of EVD in 
Germany:  
 ZMapp – Mixture of monoclonal antibodies (therapeutic approach, virus reduction), 
 Favipiravir – RNA polymerase inhibitor (virus-static),  
 Brincidofovir – Acyclic nucleic acid analogue (virus-static),  
 FX06 – Peptide (capillary leak syndrome-inhibitor), 
 TKM-Ebo - siRNA (virus-static), 
                                                     
4 A working group on the therapy of EVD was established, consisting of members of STAKOB, medical 
professional societies, PEI, BfArM and RKI. 
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 Convalescence serum – A national concept for the production and therapy is in 
preparation; possibilities for cooperation on the European level are being evaluated.   
A position paper regarding the requirements of clinical evaluations for potential medical therapies of 
EVD patients is currently being prepared by the working group on therapy of EVD (see footnote on 
page 33).  
The STAKOB treatment centers are connected with each other and with the WHO for the exchange of 
expertise. 
7.2.8	 Criteria	for	the	release	of	EVD	patients	from	hospital	
Before an EVD patient, who is recovering from the disease, can be released from the special isolation 
unit, certain criteria have to be fulfilled so that the release does not put other people in danger of 
infection.  
Recommendation	
1. Transfer of the patient to a regular infectious disease unit (conditions similar to the 
treatment of patients with e.g. open lung tuberculosis - even though Ebola viruses, in 
contrast to mycobacteria, are not transmitted by aerosols - that is vestibule, protective 
clothing), if all four of the following conditions are fulfilled:  
 Clinical symptoms have subsided, 
 Patient must be able to comply to rules (stable mental condition),  
 Continence in urine and stool, solid stool (after transfer, usage of  bedside commode 
and professional disposal of stool and urine),  
 Negative PCR result in blood (in 2 independently taken samples at least 24h apart from 
each other).  
2. The patient can be fully released from the hospital, if all three of the following conditions are 
fulfilled:  
 All conditions listed under 1,  
 No infectious virus in cell culture (in 2 independently taken samples at least 24h apart 
from each other), testing urine, stool, sweat, conjunctival swab and mouth-swab,  
 Education on potential sexual transmission of the infection even after full recovery, since 
Ebola viruses can be detected for up to three month after onset of symptoms in seminal 
fluid.    
7.2.9	 Handling	of	deceased	
Post‐mortem	care		
 Direct handling of patients deceased of EVD should be reduced to a minimum.  
 Manipulations of the deceased body (e.g. embalming) are prohibited.   
 Internal post-mortem examination (necropsy) of the body should not take place. After the 
post-mortem examination and possible additional necessary medical examinations 
(collection of tissue samples or blood samples) the body should immediately be fully 
covered with special absorbent powder. This material can bind body fluids and additionally 
functions as a disinfectant.  
35 
 
 Then the body is to be covered in two formalin-drenched sheets (10% solution). 
Subsequently, the body must be placed in two tightly sealable, leak-proof plastic body bags 
(e.g. inside silver-grey, outside white). The closures of the bags should be taped with leak-
proof tape, such that they are sealed. The whole surface of the body bags has to be 
disinfected from the outside with a pathogen-adequate disinfectant (RKI list). After the 
appropriate required soaking time, the body can leave isolation and be placed in the 
casket.   
 The body bags are (according to VDI guideline 3891) biologically degradable after burial 
and burn without residue during cremation. Cremations are preferred over burial. For the 
preferably immediate cremation a wooden casket should be used. The casket floor should 
be covered with a sufficiently high (minimum 5 cm) layer of absorbent material (e.g. 
sawdust, wood shavings, mat of fibers).      
 For the mortician that will receive the human remains accordingly to the measures 
described, no additional protective measures are necessary.   
 The casket must be tightly locked and a biohazard sign (“highly contagious”) must be 
visibly displayed on the outside. Until cremation, the casket has to be placed in a definitely 
secure, if possible separate, and cold area. 
 For the transportation of the casket to the closest cremation unit, trained personnel are 
required. The transport has to be supervised by the authorities.  
 
For further information see reference 19. 
8.	 Communication	
A massive demand for information and communication is to be expected, should EVD occur in 
Germany. Subsequently, different entities will be in charge depending on respective target groups. 
Appropriate coordination of contents and time points will be essential to avoid public unrest and 
panic. 
8.1	 Information	for	the	Expert	Audience	
Physicians and members of police, fire departments and aid organizations are essential addressees 
due to their exposed position as primary aid and care providers and as multipliers. These target 
groups (e.g. employees of the public health service, physicians, aid workers) must be promptly and 
comprehensively informed about new developments of the situation, the assessment, as well as risks 
and protective measures in order to guarantee and support their operational capabilities. The 
communication of the public health service (ÖGD) with physicians as well as hospital staff should 
preferentially be performed through the State Chambers of Physicians, the Association of Statutory 
Health Insurance Physicians and the regional hospital associations. 
Procedure	
 Target groups will be provided with information adapted to the current situation, e.g. 
information relevant for specific occupational groups on pathogens, protective measures 
and hazard assessment, as well as on intervention measures and ongoing operations. 
Information should be available according to the different tasks and circumstances on 
federal, state and communal level.  
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 Generally, doctors should first directly contact their responsible local health authority. The 
local public health authorities are then to contact the state authorities in charge, which in 
turn should communicate with federal authorities such as the RKI. 
8.2	 Information	for	the	Population	and	the	Media	
Based on recent experience, feelings of insecurity in the population are to be expected, should EVD 
occur in Germany. Factual and objective information must be used to counteract this development 
as much as possible. In addition, the population must be informed about measures to be followed. 
Procedure	
 The manner in which public authorities communicate outbreaks of contagious diseases 
substantially influences the way in which the public deals with these crisis situations. The 
aims of the communication include minimizing the number of infections in Germany 
while avoiding overreactions which could lead to unnecessary limitations of the medical 
care available to the population. Useful and effective preventive measures based on expert 
knowledge and adapted to the specific situation should be communicated to the public. 
This requires flexible means and paths of communication tailored to the specific 
epidemiological situation. Whether or not the population will successfully implement the 
recommended preventive measures greatly depends on how the target audience views the 
source of information and whether it rates the sender of the information message as 
trustworthy. It is therefore important to address existing fears and not to withhold 
uncertainties. It might be necessary to address especially audiences that are of high risk or 
are hard to reach through target group specific communication strategies. Experts and the 
media act as multipliers for communication with the public. 
 Inconsistent or contradictory communication by different institutional players must be 
avoided. The coordination between the authorities and institutions is stated in§10 of the 
general administrative regulation for the coordination of infection protection in 
epidemically significant cases as follows: 
 
“(1) A substantial part of coping with an epidemically significant situation is the external 
communication of the authorities with 
1. the demographic groups whose health is affected, 
2. the medical expert audience, 
3. additional affected players, 
4. the general public and 
5. the media. 
 (2) Authorities in charge must ensure that communication with the groups named in 
paragraph 1 is uniform and corresponds to those groups’ informational needs. Authorities 
are to communicate the situation, its assessment, the investigations as well as the 
respective actions, including recommendations for conduct, the manner in which those 
recommendations were devised and their reasons continually, comprehensively and 
promptly. The extent of this communication should match the extent of the risk situation 
as well as the degree of interest to be expected by the general public and the media. Data 







International cooperation is necessitated due to the lack of facilities (isolation wards, S4-
laboratories, special isolation transportation/repatriation) in other countries afflicted by infection 
events. It is within the interest of the individual countries to supporting the containment of hazards 
abroad in order not to impede or endanger domestic control efforts by importing or reimporting 
cases. 
Procedure	
 Mutual information (IGV, EWRS, GHSI). 
 Active participation in international workgroups to generate joint strategies. 
 Exchange and harmonization of recommendations and strategic papers with other 
countries. 
 Identification of necessary / feasible assistance (e.g. medical resources, experts etc.). 
9.	 Evaluation	
Subsequent to an extraordinary biological risk situation, the evaluation of the structure, process, and 
results of all levels involved is necessary. Important in this process is primarily the experience 
exchange between all stakeholders involved, horizontally and vertically.  The goal is to learn from the 
event to improve the reaction in crisis for the future.    
Procedure		
Possible methods are:  
 Workshops/ focus-groups presenting a report of the results, 
 Final report (using the example of infection epidemiology) after an outbreak ended:   
- Epidemiological background, 
- Description of the case/ description of the outbreak,  
- List of people with disease as well as identified contacts (e.g. from transmission 
software) containing information regarding the gender, date of birth, appearance of 
disease, vaccine status, laboratory results, clinical course/complications,   
- Critical evaluation of the case and outbreak management,  
- Description of performed procedures and evaluation of their effectiveness,   
- Critical evaluation of the framework/ existing emergency epidemic plans, 
- If applicable, calculation of costs (costs for intensive surveillance, laboratory, 
communication, training, transport, etc.).  





ABAS  Committee for Biological Agents 
ADR European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Road 
AS  Waste key 
BMG  Federal Ministry of Health  
BNITM  Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine 
BSL   Biosafety Level  
BZgA  Federal Center for Health Education 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
DG SANCO European Commission Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General 
EAK  European Waste Catalogue 
ECDC  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
EDV  Data processing 
ELISA  Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay 
EpiLag  Weekly epidemiological telephone conference 
EU  European Union 
EVD  Ebola Virus Disease 
EWRS  EU Early Warning and Response System  
FFP3  particle filtering respirator mask 
GIS  Geographic Information System 
GMLZ   German Joint Information and Situation Center 
HEPA  High Efficiency Particulate Air 
HIV  Human Immundeficiency Virus 
IF  Immunfluorescence  
IfSG  Protection Against Infection Law 
IgG/M  Immunoglobuline G/M 
IHR  International Health Regulations 
IGV-DG German IHR-Implementation Law (2005) 
IRTW  Ambulance especially equiped for the transport of infectious patients 
IT  Information technology 
LGS  High State Health authorities, state health offices 
LAGA  States‘ Working Group on Wastes 
NT  Neutralization assay 
PMU  Philipps-University Marburg 
ÖGD  Public Health Service 
PCR  Polymerase Chain Reaction  
PEP  Post-exposure prophylaxis 
PPE  Personal Protective Equipment 
RKI  Robert Koch Institute 
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STAKOB Permanent Working Group of Medical Competence and Treatment Centers for highly 
contagious, life-threatening diseases 
TRBA  Technical Rules for Biological Agents 
UMINFO Environmental Medicine Information Exchange 
VHF  viral hemorrhagic fever 
VAH  (German) Association for Applied Hygiene 
VwV  German administrative regulation 
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Appendix A – List of areas in Africa currently potentially affected by EVD [in German] 
www.rki.de/ebolagebiete 
Appendix B – Flowchart: Initial suspicion of Ebola virus disease (EVD) – Advice for physicians in 
Germany to help recognize probable cases of EVD (German case definition) 
http://www.rki.de/EN/Content/Prevention/Ebola_virus_disease/Flowchart_Ebola.html  
 
Appendix C – List of Medical Competence and Treatment Centers for highly contagious, life-
threatening diseases and their catchment areas [in German] 
www.stakob.rki.de 
Appendix D – Advice on PPE [in German] 
www.abig.rki.de/abig/ebola-psa  
 
Appendix E – Recommended measures pertaining to a probable case of EVD diagnosed in Germany 
– Orientation for health professionals [in German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-massnahmen 
Appendix F – Malaria testing for patients with suspected Ebola virus disease (EVD) not yet 
hospitalized in a special care unit 
http://www.rki.de/EN/Content/Prevention/Ebola_virus_disease/malaria-testing_Ebola-
outbreak.html    
 
Appendix G – Notice on laboratory diagnostics for suspected EVD [in German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-labordiagnostik 
Appendix H – Biologische Arbeitsstoffe im Gesundheitswesen und in der Wohlfahrtspflege 
(TRBA 250) [in German] 
www.baua.de/de/Themen-von-A-Z/Biologische-Arbeitsstoffe/TRBA/TRBA-250.html 
Appendix I – Protective measures for activities involving biological agents in laboratories 
(TRBA 100)  
http://www.baua.de/en/Topics-from-A-to-Z/Biological-Agents/TRBA/TRBA-100.htm  
Appendix K – ‘Dummy’ table for a contact person line listing [in German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-kontaktpersonen-liste 
Appendix L – Proposed exposure risk differentiation table for contact persons to a probable or 
confirmed case of EVD and symptom diary to be kept within a 21 day potential incubation period [in 
German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-kontaktpersonen-tagebuch 
Appendix M – Recommended measures for medical and other staff who were involved in patient 
care or outbreak response during the Ebola outbreak in 2014  
http://www.rki.de/EN/Content/Prevention/Ebola_virus_disease/Ebola_returning_HCW.html 
   





Appendix O – Measures regarding disinfection and waste management as pertaining to an at least 
probable case of Ebola virus infection in Germany 
www.rki.de/ebola-disinfection  
 
Appendix P – Execution guidelines for disposal of wastes generated by health institutions (States‘ 
Working Group on Wastes (LAGA)) [in German] 
www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Krankenhaushygiene/Kommission/Downloads/LAGA-Rili.pdf 
Appendix Q – Multilateral Agreement M281 according to section 1.5.1 of appendix A of the ADR, 
regarding transport of wastes potentially contaminated with viruses able to cause viral hemorrhagic 
fevers 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/danger/multi/agree.wpf/M281.pdf   
Appendix R – Proposed packing guidelines according to MV281 with additional options / Handing 
over potentially infectious wastes for transport according to UN2814 (Ebola) [in German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-verpackungsanleitung 
Appendix S – Example for a shipping log for transport according to section 1.5.1 of the ADR (M281) 
[in German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-musterbefoerderungspapier  
Appendix T – Example for a security plan for UN 2814. Measures to secure dangerous goods and 
prevent risks according to 1.10.3.2 ADR / RID [in German] 
www.rki.de/ebola-mustersicherungsplan 
 
